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I. CUSTOMS AND CHARACTERISTIC WAYS OF LIFE

184 The Chinese imperial system was strikingly successful in fostering common basic attitudes among the peoples which it absorbed within its ever-widening sphere, but local and regional sub-cultures, brought into the imperial order at different times throughout more than two millenia did not lose all of their characteristic traits. In the East China Region, for example the oldest "Chinese" area was Shantung, portions of which were settled in the second millenium B. C. When centuries later the coastal areas of Fukien were absorbed by imperial China, the terrain and climate, the dependence on the seas and rivers for livelihood, meant that a way of life, a culture markedly different from any in North China, persisted and developed. A rough analogy may be drawn with Western Europe. Many basic attitudes and values are common to "Christian Europe" from Sicily to the Arctic. yet history and geography have made this area diverse in customs and ways of life. The diversity is less in the 1,000-mile long arc of the East China Region, partly because its cultures were never set off from one another by the nation-state boundaries that divide modern Europe.

841 181 There are other factors which give to most of the area we are now considering important uniformities in culture. The expansion of "Chinese culture" from Honan and Shantung into

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532 The Chinese, especially the Chinese Com-
538 munists, often speak of literature and the arts as one. In the Communists' policy statements, what pertains to literature also pertains to the other arts. Therefore, as far as the theory and policy of the arts are concerned, no separate treatment is necessary.

532 In less sophisticated folk literature and
538 folk art, however, East China exhibits some
184 unique regional characteristics. But even in this respect, the East-China Region is by no means an integrated whole: Shantung is more closely related to the North China tradition, and is oriented toward Hopei rather than toward the provinces in the south; Fukien has South China characteristics not shared by other provinces in the region. Furthermore, in the mountains of southern Chekiang and western Fukien there are minority groups who have forms of intellectual and artistic expressions unlike those of the Han Chinese.

I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LITERARY ACTIVITIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

814 The reform of literature and art (wen-i cheng-feng) at Yenan in 1942[1] made the practice

1. Mao Tse-tung's speeches at the Party School in Yenan in February and at the Yenan Literary and Art Circles' meeting in May 1942 established the "line" of literature and art endorsed by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which has since been upheld as the creed of writers and artists in Communist

(continued next page)

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 1r,
Sociological Background

ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS

000 The attitudes of an individual, although conditioned by the environment in which he lives and influenced by the persons with whom he comes in contact, are subject to changes that are well-nigh unpredictable; he may simultaneously adopt diametrically opposed attitudes without being aware of inconsistency. This fact, coupled with China's multitudinous regions and groups of people of varying characteristics, makes the task of gauging the attitudes of the Chinese people an exceedingly risky one at best. The Chinese, in general, are traditionally less articulate and less outspoken than Westerners. However, since attitudes manifest themselves in reactions, and some of the reactions of the Chinese people are observable even in the official Communist announcements, a few very general and broad conclusions may be drawn. In this discussion, attention is focused on the attitudes of the various groups of Chinese toward their country, the Communist government, and the ambitions and aspirations of the individual.

• 184 In sociological studies, occupational stratification is one recognized criterion for analyzing any society. In adopting this approach for our discussion, we do not propose to overlook the significance of grouping the people

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184 according to other equally valid criteria such as sex, age, and income. Older people, for example, are generally more conservative, less willing to adapt to change, and less likely to show enthusiasm for the Communist program. The rich, who have more to lose, are generally more dissatisfied with the Communist regime than their poorer countrymen. These patterns of attitudes tend to cut across the occupational stratification. In view of the technical limitations imposed on this discussion, occupational stratification will be used, with allowance for the exceptions within each category.

I. FARMERS

565 184 The rich absentee-landowners of China, whose social status ranks with those of government bureaucrats and whose interests are identified with those of rich merchants, are all but nonexistent in Mainland China today. The Chinese farmer class consists chiefly of poor peasants and "middle farmers" holding small lots of land. These people have had little opportunity to identify themselves with the state or its destiny. However, because East China has received more official attention in economic development than have Central-South and Southwest China in the past decades, the farmers in this region are likely to be more aware of the existence of a community greater than their immediate environs. With the exception of those in southern Fukien, most of the farmers in East

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565 China find that only a minor language barrier separates them from the northern or western Chinese. The average East China farmer will not feel himself a stranger in Peking, for example as would a farmer from Canton or Yunnan. In those areas of East China which were overrun by the Japanese during World War II, there has been sufficient reason for the growth of a spirit of nationalism among the farming class. This is true in Shantung as in Southern Fukien, one of the routes followed by the Japanese in invading Central-South China.

The Communists have made persistent efforts to "educate and propagandize" the farmers. There is evidence that many farmers in East China have learned a few political terms; however, this does not mean that the farmers have developed a strong national feeling. On the contrary, some of the farmers may regard the Communist effort to "educate" them as unwelcome interference. Generally speaking, the young tend to show a more favorable response to Communist propaganda than their elders.

The idea that he is to be given land probably has generated apprehension even in the poorest peasant, who always wants to own land. To be sure, the gain through the process of land reform must have given the poor peasant some satisfaction, but subsequent grain taxes remain heavy and Communist efforts to collectivize the marketing of farm produce have met a great deal

184 of resistance. There is reason to believe that
565 the poor farmer in East China today is less happy than he was in the days immediately after the completion of land reform. The possibility still exists that changes in government policy may regain for the regime some of the farmer's enthusiasm. However, the fact that authorities in Shanghai have had to initiate a drive to send many peasants back to their villages indicates that life in rural communities in East China does not offer incentive. As a result farmers continue to flood metropolitan centers in search of work and a better living.

657 Available reports show that neither the
565 government nor the farmers are satisfied with the amount of relief and welfare work done thus far, nor with the manner in which this work is done. The Communists claim that the productive harvests in 1951-53 in East China were attributable to the completion of flood control projects on the Hwai River in Anhwei and on the I and Shu rivers in Shantung. Some of the farmers may believe this claim, but the majority will measure the "benevolence" of the new regime against the few benefits so far received.

186 The Chinese farmer's picture of a foreign
565 culture is derived from contact with foreign missionaries. At one time foreign churches were established in all parts of East China with the exception of a few remote districts in southwestern Fukien. Government efforts to foster

186 xenophobia, supported by the effort of the ultra-
565 nationalistic segment of the Chinese elite, dated from the late nineteenth century. Some farmers in this region, particularly those in Shantung Province, are likely to remember, for instance, the stories about the Boxer Rebellion, which terrorized many foreigners. With relish, the Communists are re-telling such stories as specimens of "anti-imperialistic" expressions of the Chinese people. A very small number of farmers who have been less influenced by anti-foreign propaganda and who have received benefits from foreign missionaries may be disturbed by the deliberate mistreatment of missionaries on the mainland. Other farmers who regard the missionaries as an undesirable group may chuckle at the thought of the "foreign devils' downfall." But the majority of farmers have had little or no contact with foreigners; they are not particularly concerned with the latter's fate in Communist China.

• 184 The Chinese farmer has always hoped to
565 safeguard his family by acquiring land to provide a better education for his children and to maintain the respect of fellow villagers. Now that the farmer can no longer obtain as much land as he hopes, his interest turns to finding ways in which his children, through education, can advance on the socio-economic ladder. The fact that many young people from peasant families have been absorbed in the government "cadre" system may induce the Chinese farmer to look

184 more kindly upon the present regime. Of course,
565 there are exceptions among the farming population. Farmers active in secret societies, which are traditionally resistant to government control, may have an altogether different set of attitudes toward the nation, foreigners, and the individual's role in society. Mass uprisings in which secret societies played an important part indicate that sometimes these groups have distinctly anti-foreign or anti-government characteristics. Members of some of these groups may uphold a standard of loyalty to the individual above traditional loyalty to the family or to the state; others may condone banditry and defy all forms of established social order.

II. URBAN WORKERS

The group feeling of organized workers in China was aroused as early as the 1920's in industrial centers like Shanghai and Tsingtao, where organized labor was involved in many political movements. Many industrial workers have long realized that they were "in the group" and somewhat later came to the conclusion that they had to work "for the group" in those movements launched against foreign influence and private capital. Having been involved in these movements, the worker undoubtedly formed a more definite idea of the nation and its symbols than that of the average farmer.

The Communist avowed attempt to raise the status of the worker must have given the worker

184 a feeling of importance as he learned of the
565 Communists' economic reconstruction plan. He derives a measure of pride of achievement when a steel plant is ere ted or when a bridge is built, although he may not really believe that the workers, as the Communists say, are the masters of the new China. Other promosed benefits, including job security and welfare provisions, also add to the popularity of the Communist regime among the workers, despite the fact that most of these "benefits" still remain largely promises.

466 On the liability side of the Communist
565 policy toward the worker are the lack of substantial wage increases, a harsher work schedule and loss of leisure time, and an illusory welfare program which the Communists themselves admit cannot be brought into the hands of the worker until he has worked still harder to produce still more. Thus the worker's attitude toward the government and its policy must depend on how much he believes in a glorious "tomorrow" and how well he can put up with the physical hardship of "today." The recent let-up in "labor emu ation" drives and the sudden flurry of official warnings against driving the worker too hard appear to indicate that the laboring class is showing signs of possible exhaustion. In addition, the worker's attitude may also be greatly influenced by the rise of a new managerial class which is being fostered by the Communists and which, for whatever reasons, receives better treatment than do those who work on the

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III. STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS

517 184 565 Of all the groups of people in China, the intellectuals are probably the most varied in their attitudes. They do not constitute a "class," hence their attitudes do not show any distinctive "group" characteristics. There are those whose strong convictions make them active leaders of social and political movements in defiance of authoritarian rule; there are others whose education and experience make them flexible under pressure. Hence no dependable conclusion on the attitudes of the Chinese intellectuals as a group has been arrived at.

Though the attitudes of Chinese intellectuals differ, the great majority of them are exceedingly patriotic. It is therefore conceivable that to some of them, at least, the Communist emphasis on loyalty to the state rather than the traditional loyalty to the family must have a great appeal. There is reason to believe that most of them who accepted Communism in 1949 did so because they saw in the Communist program some hope of restoring China to a position of dignity and power. After five years of Communist rule, some of the intellectuals are probably elated by the truculence with which Red China has been conducting its foreign affairs, and by the feeling that China, at long last, has been unified and become a nation of importance. But on the negative side there are the restrictions on intellectual freedom imposed by the Communists.

517 Furthermore, the Communist policy of gradually
●184 substituting the freshly trained and well-in-
565 doctrinated intellectuals for those who have had a "liberal" or "conservative" background must have created a sense of insecurity among many.

Traditionally, Chinese intellectuals aspired to high positions in the government, where they could attain wealth, social esteem, and influence. For those intellectuals who still harbor such personal ambitions, it must be heartening to see people with no seniority in either the Party hierarchy or the government bureaucracy among the ranks of the nation's leaders in all fields. For others, who have modified their personal ambitions and who sincerely wish to make their training useful to the country, something they have been unable to do for many years in the past, Peking's policy of finding a place for intellectuals in the national reconstruction program is a welcome move.

Since the early days of the Chinese Communist movement, the Communists have always had the enthusiastic support of students. Many loyal Communist cadres are recruited from among the students who, so far, have not shown any lack of enthusiasm for the Communist cause. However, while accepting Communism as their ideal, the students may not be able to suppress entirely a simultaneous impulse toward individualism.

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IV. BUSINESSMEN AND INDUSTRIALISTS

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441 Few industrialists are left in Communist China today, but small-businessmen and manufacturers, who have made up the larger part of China's urban population, continue to exist, although in reduced number. Commerce has always occupied an inferior position in traditional Chinese social strata, while industry is something relatively new and its position in Chinese society has yet to be clearly defined. In general, merchants and manufacturers, who had operated under government restrictions even in pre-Communist days, are cool-headed realists. They are not easily swayed by high-sounding phrases. There have been few occasions when symbols of the state could evoke intimate sentiment among the merchants and small manufacturers except, perhaps, at a time when foreign goods flooded the Chinese market and caused dislocation in the Chinese economy.

Under the Peking regime, businessmen and industrialists as a group fare badly (possibly not much better than rich landowners), and the general mood in industrial and commercial circles is most probably unfavorable toward the government. The Communists have made it clear that small businessmen and manufacturers are only tolerated in the transitional stage of the "New Democracy," and that there will be no room for private enterprise in the socialist society which is the ultimate goal of the Communist

• 184 regime. Meanwhile, these people have to carry
441 a large share of the tax burden and face the stiff competition of state enterprises. There is evidence that the businessmen and manufacturers, accustomed as they are to government interference, are finding the controls imposed by the Communist government much more strict, making it increasingly difficult to manipulate or elude restrictive measures. This general mood of discontent is particularly observable in cities like Shanghai and Ningpo where business and industry had been the backbone of urban prosperity.

If profit has been the most common motive among businessmen and manufacturers, under the present circumstances they have been forced to abandon or at least restrain their ambitions. Some of those who were allowed to do so have made a second choice--that of changing their careers. The most sturdily rooted have escaped the wave of purges by co-operating with the Communist regime. In this connection the Communists have appointed a number of erstwhile influential financiers and industrialists to serve in the government; it may be merely a conciliatory gesture of the Communists to win the support of small business, but it does provide this class of people with one temporary alternative to their lost hope.

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184 An additional factor to provoke dissatis-
441 faction among the merchants is the control on foreign trade. Merchants in East China seaports, who have had the advantage of monopolizing a large portion of the nation's foreign trade, have been deprived of this opportunity because virtually all foreign trade is now handled by the government. Their role has been reduced to that of conducting limited export transactions supervised by the government, and there is no hope that they may be allowed to import Western manufactured goods.

V. WOMEN

562 The customary position of women in China
184 is subordinate to that of men. This tradition was so deep-rooted that it took superhuman courage for the first women to claim their "right"; and the pain of "emancipation" continues under the Communists.

To the "emancipated" belongs responsibility; this is at least theoretically true, and the Chinese women who have exchanged one form of drudgery for another are generally expected to have a degree of political consciousness similar to that of men of equal education and comparable environment. In many cases women prove to be even more "patriotic" than men as a result of the unprecedented government effort to show the women that they, too, can achieve enviable social recognition by a show of "patriotism."

562 How much improvement in the status of the
184 women has been brought about by the Communists? Women are encouraged to participate in political activities; more tangibly and closer to their daily life, they are given child care, adult education, and other welfare benefits if they join the working force. If the increase in the number of women workers in factories can be taken as an indication of the women's own free choice, then women in Communist China may indeed feel favorably disposed toward the Communist regime. But upon closer observation their entry into factory work may have been out of financial necessity rather than free choice.

The much-publicized marriage law in Communist China embodies nothing new, but its vigorous and often arbitrary enforcement is unprecedented. Even this Communist law, seemingly for the benefit of women, has engendered mixed feelings. Acceptance of this law will mean the destruction of some of the most stubborn traditions in China (See discussion of the marriage law in the chapter on The Family).

Some women hold high posts in government, and there are "labor heroines" in all industries. Housewives in larger cities manage to live in leisure if they belong to the high income group. Younger housewives in families of modest income may have to work outside the home, but there is no indication that they resent it. The age-group differential asserts itself in the reaction of

562 women to the new regime; older women who had
184 learned to live in peace with the extended family system are likely to dread the Communist effort to reduce the extended family to the conjugal family; younger women are more apt to feel favorably disposed toward the Peking regime.

A sharp difference in attitude is to be observed between the women in Kiangsu (particularly in such larger cities as Shanghai and Nanking) and those in the more remote districts in Fukien. City life had caused changes in attitudes among women in Shanghai even before the Communists announced their policy with regard to women and their status in society. Most of the women in western Fukien villages remain more strictly tradition-bound and are less prepared to accept the ideas introduced by the Peking government.

VI. NATIONAL MINORITIES

563 A larger degree of assimilation of minority
184 nationalities is observed in East China than in Southwest or Central-South China. Hence there are fewer distinguishing features of the attitudes of minority nationalities in this region. Generally speaking, the minority groups in China have never felt any great loyalty toward the larger political entity of China. The Communist policy is to cultivate a feeling of kinship between these groups and the Han-Chinese. To substantiate this policy, the government has been trying to develop for

563 the minority groups their own languages and to
184 provide these people with more educational opportunities. There is a persistent effort to publicize the achievement of individuals belonging to minority groups. While this may be nothing more than a propaganda device, its effect on scattered minority nationalities in such places as Chien-ning and Ch'ang-ting in western Fukien is not to be underestimated.

VII. OTHER GROUPS

184 In addition to the groups discussed, there
662 are other groups which, although minor in numerical strength, are of importance because their attitudes do have significant bearing on the tensions in Chinese society.

It is evident that all Communist Party members and all government bureaucrats do not necessarily have the same attitudes, in spite of the fact that they are regimented by a well-controlled machine. High-ranking Communist officials exhibited intense feelings of patriotism and dedication to the "cause" in the early days of their careers. They are now working to strengthen the machine which brought them to power, thereby making certain that they will not be deposed. Granted that the behind-the-scene struggle for personal power in a Soviet system is most difficult to discern, there have been few signs of antagonism among the top leaders. A purge as violent as that which took place in

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184 Russia in the 1930's at present cannot be
662 predicted for China. Overshadowed by the unique personal prestige and cohesive power of Mao Tse-tung, the high-ranking Communist leaders have yet to offer evidence of power-seeking at the risk of disrutping Party harmony and hegemony. This, of course, does not preclude the future development of discord among Party leaders. East China, where many of the Communist economic plans are being tried out, may prove to be a testing ground for Party unity. The downfall in 1954 of Jao Shu-shih, head of the East China regional government, might have far-reaching repercussions.

The personnel in lower Party echelons are subject to tremendous pressures from all sides. Even the most devoted Party workers are expected to prove their loyalty to Communism The fact that the Party relies on close surveillance and an atmosphere of fear in order to keep members in line indicates the existence of dissatisfaction and dissidence within the Party ranks. Expansion of industrial centers in East China necessitates the promotion of numerous lower-level Party functionaries. This certainly will tend to cause dissatisfaction among the old Party cadres when they see the rise of new cadres to positions equal to or higher than their own. Generally speaking, cadres assigned to rural areas are less enthusiastic about the regime than those in urban areas who live in more comfortable circumstances and have more frequent opportunities for advancement.

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184 Former Nationalist officials had their
642 darkest days during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, when almost all lived under the imminent threat of violence and death. After these intensive campaigns had subsided, a few former Kuomintang personnel remained among the Communist government bureaucrats. There is no doubt that these former Kuomintang personnel are reminded of the necessity of proving their thorough conversion to Communism. A sense of insecurity affects this group more visibly than it does the "securely situated" segments of the Chinese population.

VIII. CONCLUSION

184 The Communist system of multiple control, which penetrates all aspects of life, and the Communist effort to maintain a strong tie with Russia are two major causes of dissatisfaction among the Chinese people. Regimentation, when carried to the extreme, provokes the resistance of the people. Subservience to the Soviet Union destroys the sense of national pride which the Communists have been trying to cultivate in China. There is evidence that Peking is attempting to reduce the possibility of friction between the Russians and the Chinese without damaging the ideological kinship and the diplomatic relationship between China and the Soviet Union. The activities of the wide-spread Sino-Russian Friendship Association, and the

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• /84 continual propaganda on Russian aid to Communist China, indicate a sustained effort to create a favorable attitude toward Russia.

The general patterns of attitudes we have discussed can serve only as indications of the prevailing social mood among various groups. Sociologists agree that it is difficult to predict group response. This, it appears, must apply to a study of a people so various in temperament as the Chinese.